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Abstract 
This work quantitatively assesses the economic reasons behind the difference in 
prices paid by care home residents in England. It is generally believed that the price 
paid by private payers is higher than that paid for publicly-supported residents, and 
this is often attributed to the market power wielded by local authorities as the 
dominant purchaser in local markets. Using data from 2008 and 2010 at the local 
authority level, where funding support decisions are generally made, average self-
funder prices are calculated. Estimations of the difference in price paid, the fees 
gap, controlling for local area and care home characteristics, show that both care 
home and local authority market power play a vital role in the price determination 









Public funding of care home services for older people in England is on a means-tested 
basis. Those people who do not qualify for state-support (in full or in part)  W generally 
paid through local authorities (LA-funded residents)  W are obliged to fund their own 
care (self-funded residents). Most care homes will take residents from either funding 
source, although a small minority of care homes focus solely on the self-funding 
sector of the market. The prices paid by self-funded residents are usually higher than 
fees paid for LA-funded residents. However, whilst (average) prices paid by local 
authorities are publically available, little is further known nationally about the prices 
that self-funders pay for their care home place and therefore there is no evidence as 
to the reasons for the gap in fees. This work determines the causes as to the gap in 
fees paid by local authorities for residents eligible for support and self-funded 
residents. In doing so, we calculate average self-funder prices at the LA-level. We 
believe this to be the first time that average self-funder prices have been calculated 
for all LAs in England and the reasons for the difference in price paid by funding types 
examined. 
The empirical evidence in the literature of the implications of different sources of 
demand in the English care homes market is scant. The extent and (total) value of 
self-funders has been examined (Forder, 2007; Putting People First Social Care 
Consortium, 2011) and it has been found that self-funders will have longer stays in 
residential care (Forder and Fernandez, 2011). Hancock and Hviid (2010) examined 
the effect of LA market power in England theoretically and using simulations showed 
that under a modest level of LA market power self-funder prices would be higher but 
only a very few private payers would be squeezed out of the market. For the US, 
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Stewart et al. (2009) examined public and private payer price growth between 1977 
and 2004, and Troyer (2002) examined cross-subsidisation in Florida nursing homes.  
From a policy point of view, this work also contributes to an improved understanding 
of the impact that current budget reductions for social care have on the care homes 
market.1 If, foƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?>Ɛ ?ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚŵĂƌŬĞƚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝƐĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ
of the fees gap then prices for LA-funded residents can be expected to be pushed 
down as a result of the budget cuts. Providers in distress due to the lower LA fees 
(and also rising costs) consequently become more reliant on the private segment of 
the market. Depending on the presence of other market characteristics that affect 
the fees gap and are explored in this paper, providers may increase self-funder prices 
to cross-subsidise LA-funded residents. At worst, we could observe more care home 
closures and greater polarisation of services between affluent and less affluent areas 
(Office of Fair Trading, 2005; County Councils Network and LaingBuisson, 2015). 
Understanding the main drivers of prices in the care homes market therefore 
provides a framework within which to better study how different financing 
arrangements can feed into the market. 
The causes of price differences across payer types are examined by looking at the 
Local Authority (LA) level, where, broadly speaking, public commissioning decisions 
are made. In particular, we attempt to determine the effect that both public 
commissioners and competition have on the difference in average price paid by 
ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĂŶĚƉƵďůŝĐƉĂǇĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĨĞĞƐŐĂƉ ? ?ƵƐŝŶŐĚĂƚĂĨŽƌ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ?A natural 
problem that arises is to quantify the level of market power that LA commissioners 
have; using principle component analysis we construct a market power index based 
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on available proxies of LA power. In acquiring estimates of the average fees gap we 
estimate average self-funded resident fees at the LA-level. In doing so, we take into 
account NHS-funded nursing care payments, out-of-area placements (one LA 
funding a resident in a care home located in another LA), outlier costs, LA-funded 
resident proportions, and missing price data.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the conceptual model 
that frames the empirical analysis, section 3 describes the data and empirical 
approach, section 4 presents the results, and section 5 provides a discussion of the 
findings.  
Conceptual model 
The English care homes market for older people consists of around 10,000 
independent sector (for- and not-for-profit) care homes. As described above, the 
care homes market consists of two distinct demand streams, self-funded and LA-
funded residents.2 For the period examined in this work, 2008-2010, qualifying for 
LA-funding depended on being able to meet eligibility criteria for both needs and 
financial assets. Placement decisions were made by a social worker or care 
manager, and, in theory, as long as the placement ǁĂƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƵƐƵĂůƉƌŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĂƚ
the LA was willing to pay, LA-funded residents had a choice over which homes they 
preferred.3. 
Self-funders in residential care are either those that do not qualify for LA-funded 
care based on needs or financial eligibility, or those that choose to not ask for help 
from their LA when it comes to funding residential care (Forder, 2007). Often, care 
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managers and/or social workers will be involved in their decision, and full 
assessments will have taken place (Netten and Darton, 2003).  
There is no regulation of prices in the English care homes market (Forder and Allan, 
2011). Pricing decisions in the market will therefore depend on the power that each 
player in the purchasing decision has. Care homes are likely to have considerable 
levels of market power over individual self-funders. This is primarily because the 
decision to move into a care home is usuaůůǇĂ ‘ĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂ
decision on which care home to choose has to be made quickly due to a change in 
circumstances (usually a deterioration in health). In addition, there is an asymmetry 
of information; an individual will typically only make this purchase once and they 
will commonly only decide between a few care homes (Netten and Darton, 2003). 
Evidence from UK and US studies do suggest that care homes have at least some 
market power and that potential residents are sensitive to price (Nyman, 1989; 
Forder, 2000; Mukamel and Spector, 2002).  
Despite certain levels of market power existing for care homes, anecdotal evidence 
relating to the English care homes sector suggests that margins are very tight. A 
reason for this is that LAs, as the major buyer of care home places in most local care 
homes markets, are likely to exert strong levels of market power over care homes. 
This will come from both a supply side effect and a demand side effect. Where 
supply is strong this is likely to increase competition for LA-funded residents and so 
>ƐĐĂŶ ‘Ɖlay-ŽĨĨ ?ƚŚĞĐĂƌĞŚŽŵĞƐĚƌŝǀŝŶŐĚŽǁŶƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞƚŚĞǇƉĂǇ ?&ŽƌĚĞƌĂŶĚůůĂŶ
(2014) showed that increased competition reduced quality in the English care 
homes market but that the effect worked through price  W which is consistent with 
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LA market power. The market power gained from demand relates to the level of LA-
funded residents in a local market, i.e. the greater their level in a local market the 
more reliant will care homes in that market be on the LA.   
If the fee paid by a local authority was below the (marginal) cost of a placement, 
then a care home would have to cross-subsidise by charging self-funding residents 
higher prices (Hancock and Hviid, 2010). A study funded by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation concluded that most public sector commissioning bodies did not pay 
fees at levels that were adequate to support and sustain a care home sector that 
met all of the National Minimum Standards (Laing, 2008).  Laing (2015) found for 
twelve English counties that fees were 43 per cent higher on average for self-
funders than LA-funded residents within the same care home for the same type of 
room. However, given that many care homes are predominantly, or totally, reliant 
on LA-funded residents it would be unrealistic to assume that all LAs pay fees below 
marginal cost. An OFT (2005) study of the care homes market found that around 20 
per cent of care homes charged self-funded residents more than LA-funded 
residents for similar conditions of care. 
A similar price differential is found in the US nursing home market, where public 
(Medicaid) pay rates are around 70 per cent of private pay rates (Mukamel and 
Spector, 2002; Grabowski, 2004). Troyer (2002) found that Medicaid residents in 
Florida nursing homes were cheaper to care for than self-funded residents, and 
there was also evidence that for a large minority of homes Medicaid rates were 
below the level necessary to cover costs of care and that self-payer rates were 
higher than necessary. For these cross-subsidising homes the self-funder rates were 
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higher because of an inter-temporal premium, i.e. to cover the potential spend 
down of assets to qualify for (unprofitable) Medicaid coverage. 
Whilst direct observation of prices in England confirms significant price dispersal 
and differentiation between LA-funded and self-funded residents, it is less clear 
whether there is actual cross-subsidisation, and to what extent. Indeed, there are 
other reasons that could explain these pricing patterns. First, as outlined above, the 
observed price differentiation could be explained by care homes exercising their 
market power through price discrimination for the same quality product. The 
distinction between LA-funded and self-funded residents does make this plausible. 
A high level of market power would be required to maintain prices above marginal 
costs. This level of market power could exist in the care homes market since 
potential residents, in particular self-funders, have limited information about 
service provision, prices and quality of care homes and acquiring information often 
includes significant (transaction) costs. Theoretically it has been shown that large 
information asymmetries and costly information, which can be in the form of 
ƐĞĂƌĐŚĐŽƐƚƐ ?ĐĂŶůĞĂĚƚŽŵĂƌŬĞƚƐĨĂŝůŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞůĞŵŽŶ ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ? ?Žƌ ?ŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇ ?ƚŽ
prices above competitive levels (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz, 1979; Diamond, 1971; Salop, 
1976; Salop and Stiglitz, 1977; Salop, 1977). 
Second, there could be vertical quality differentiation where self-funders express a 
greater preference for quality and thus could be paying for a better quality product, 
even in the same care home. Places with higher quality would have higher 
(marginal) costs, and so observed price differences could still be explained even 
with prices set at marginal cost.  
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A number of theoretical analyses outline the conditions under which a (Nash) 
equilibrium with vertical differentiation can be sustained with the firm(s) setting 
prices above marginal cost, particularly for the higher-quality products in the 
market (Shaked and Sutton, 1982; Shaked and Sutton, 1983; Gal-Or, 1983; De Fraja, 
1993; Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Srinagesh and Bradburd, 1989). Nonetheless, with 
free market entry, variable costs that rise with quality and significant heterogeneity 
of preferences for quality (given price) among consumers, price (Bertrand) 
competition will lead to markets that are characterised by a range of qualities and 
prices at marginal costs.  
Third, the existence of economies of scale at the home and group level might also 
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĨŽƌƉƌŝĐĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂůƐ ?/ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƉƌŝĐĞĚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƐĨŽƌ ‘ďƵůŬƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞ ?ďǇ
LAs may exist, either for care homes to reach optimal scales of operation or as a 
way of dealing with uncertainty about local demand (occupancy rates). If 
economies of scale are significant, incumbent providers can sustain cross-
subsidisation between LA and self-funded clients making close to normal profit 
levels overall. Where the market for self-funders is relatively small locally, new 
entrants would not be able to undercut the price mark-ups made on self-funder 
clients because they cannot achieve economies of scale without LA-funded 
residents (providers are unlikely to achieve optimal size by just focusing on self-
funders).  
LA-funded residents, still the majority source of placements, are usually seen by 
care homes as the core clientele. This may change in time as self-funding is 
becoming more prevalent.4 Indeed, some care home groups (e.g. Barchester 
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Healthcare and Sunrise Assisted Living) are solely aimed at the self-pay market, 
although these homes provide highly differentiated, high quality services. They also 
tend to locate in the most affluent areas (Laing & Buisson, 2012). Other big 
providers, such as Bupa Care Homes, have a largely representative mix of LA-
funded and self-funded residents.  
This discussion has identified four potential drivers that could explain differences 
between LA-funded and self-funded prices: market power of care homes i.e. 
competition; market power of LAs; quality differentiation; and economies of scale. 
The empirical analyses that follows assesses the effects of each of these on the 
price differences between the average LA-funded and self-funded price at the LA-
level. Our expectations, a priori, are that:  
1) That the effect of an increase in competition in a local care homes market 
will be a fall in both LA-funded and self-funded prices, and therefore the 
effect on the price difference is ambiguous. However, we might expect that 
competition will have a stronger negative effect on self-funded prices since 
mark-ups are likely to be higher in the self-funded sector of the market.  
2) That an increase in LA market power will increase the gap in fees paid by 
self-funded and LA-funded residents. 
3) That the effect of quality on price differences is ambiguous due to the 
endogenous nature of the quality decision in the pricing decision. We might 
expect differences in quality to increase the fees gap since self-funders are 
likely to value quality to a greater extent.  
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4) That the greater is the number of residents required to minimise costs the 
greater will be the fees gap. 
Data and empirical approach 
Data 
Care home-level data is taken from a panel of all care homes in England and then 
averaged at the LA-level. Broadly, the panel was created from matching the CQC 
register of care homes for May 2008 and September 2010 to price data from Laing 
& Buisson.5 The Laing & Buisson prices directory contains minimum and maximum 
prices per week by room type (single and other) and client-type (nursing or 
residential). A blended (mean) price was constructed by taking the average of 
minimum and maximum price for the service (client and room) types available in 
the home. Information on the number of beds of each type for each home was not 
available, only whether or not the service was provided. 
Both the costs to, and number of funded residents by, LAs were obtained from 
council-level unit costs reports available from the Health and Social Care 
Information Centre (now NHS Digital). Data on LA-level characteristics were 
obtained from the Office for National Statistics.  
Estimating LA-level average self-funder price 
A natural estimate of the average self-funded price can be calculated with 
knowledge of the average price of a care home place and the average LA-funded 
resident cost. In particular, we assume that the observed (average) price (per week) 
for a place in an independent care home is a function of the cost (price) per LA-
funded resident located in the LA and the price per self-funded resident: 
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௝ܲ ൌ ௝݊ ௝ܲ௅஺ ൅ ൫ ? െ ௝݊൯ ௝ܲௌி     ሺ ?ሻ 
Where ௝ܲ is the (average) care home price, ௝ܲ௅஺is the (average) cost per LA-funded 
resident located in the Local Authority, ௝݊  is the proportion of residents funded by 
(any) LAs in LA ݆, and ௝ܲௌி  is the (average) price of a self-funded place.  
Rearranging, the (average) self-funder price per week for LA j is equal to: 
௝ܲௌி ൌ ௉ೕି௡ೕ௉ೕಽಲሺଵି௡ೕሻ        ሺ ?ሻ 
We attempt to estimate self-funder prices for 150 LAs for 2008 and 2010.6 The 
details of the estimation process, and the estimated values, of self-funded prices by 
LA are presented in the Appendix, along with the average and regional average 
costs per LA-funded resident.  
There were a number of issues that arose when estimating average self-funder 
prices at the LA-level, and therefore the estimated fees-gap as a consequence. First, 
a number of LAs (ten LA observations across the two years for eight LAs) had an 
estimated proportion of LA-funded residents over 1, suggesting that there would be 
no market for self-funded residents in these LAs. As a result, we exclude these LA 
observations from the analysis. 
Second, a number of the estimated average self-funded price for the remaining LAs 
were clearly not plausible. This was for a number of reasons: where the average 
cost per LA-funded resident is (much) higher than the average price of a care home 
place then the estimated self-funded price will be (extremely) low; where there are 
a (very) high proportion of LA-funded residents in the LA then the estimated self-
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funded price will be (extremely) high; and a combination of higher (lower) average 
cost per LA-funded resident than average price and a high proportion of LA-funded 
residents will push the estimated self-funded price down (up). 
We attempted to resolve some of these issues in two ways: first, average regional 
costs were used in place of LA-level average costs: and second, we trimmed the 
proportion of residents that are LA-funded, ௝݊ , to the 95th (5th) percentile for those 
LAs with high (low) ௝݊ .  
Estimating LA-level average fees gap 
Even with the changes outlined above, a number of the estimated self-funder prices 
were still clearly incorrect.  Therefore, for those LAs where we believe there is a 
market for self-funded residents but where the estimated self-funder price seems 
unrealisƚŝĐƚŚĞĨĞĞƐŐĂƉŝƐŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚ ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ? ?tĞĐŽƵůĚĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵŝƐƐŝŶŐĚĂƚĂ
is entirely random. However, we can use multiple imputation (MI) to ignore the 
exact process that led the data to be missing. We impute an adjusted fees gap for 
those LAs with ௝݊  above (below) the 90th (10th) percentile and for those LAs that 
had greater than 20 per cent of care homes not reporting any price data (which 
could influence the observed average price, and hence cause the issues outlined in 
section 3.2, particularly for LAs with relatively few homes).7  
LA market power index 
There is no definitive measure of the market power that LA commissioners have. 
We attempt to measure this by creating a categorical variable to identify the level 
of market power each LA has. We performed principal component analysis (PCA) on 
three variables that can be used as proxies of market power: the total number of 
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care homes in the LA; the proportion of care homes that are not part of a care 
home group (a chain of three or more homes); and the proportion of the older 
population that claim pension credit.8 We believe that as each of these increase so 
the market power for LA commissioners increase.9 
The results of the PCA are presented in Table 1. The first principal component 
accounts for 61 per cent of the total variation in the data, with an eigenvalue of 
1.82, and mainly measures the overall size (and composition) of the local care 
homes market, contrasting it with pension credit uptake (a proxy for income levels). 
The second principal component mainly measures income levels and the 
composition of the supply side of the market once market size has been accounted 
for, and accounts for 24 per cent of the variation. A third principal component 
explains 16 per cent of the variation of the data. hƐŝŶŐ<ĂŝƐĞƌ ?ƐƌƵůĞǁĞƌĞƚĂŝŶŽŶůǇ
the first principal component as it is the only component with an eigenvalue greater 
than one. Component scores for each LA are then estimated and we created a LA 
power index using the component score to separate LAs equally out in to low, 
medium and high market power groups. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 2 and 3 for the final sample of LAs for 
2008 and 2010. Table 2 shows the various per week fees gaps between the average 
price paid by self-funded residents and LA-funded residents, respectively. The basic 
fees-gap is measured as the difference between the estimated basic, unadjusted, 
self-pay price and the average cost paid by LAs for a place in a care home provided 
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by others (corrected for out-of-area placements). The adjusted fees gap is the 
difference between the adjusted self-pay price (where ௝݊  is trimmed, regional 
average LA cost and predicted average price are used as discussed above) and the 
regional average cost paid for a place in a care home provided by others. This is our 
preferred measure of the price difference.  
As robustness checks three other measures of the fees gap are included: where the 
adjusted average self-funded price is estimated based on 85 per cent or 95 per cent 
occupancy rates; and where we assume that self-funded residents and LA-funded 
residents pay the average maximum and minimum price observed in each LA, 
respectively (assuming a 90 per cent occupancy rate, as the basic and adjusted fees 
gaps do). The non-imputed data show a range for the average (per week) fees gap 
of £170 to £196, with the preferred, adjusted, fees gap being £180. For the imputed 
data the same figures are £147 to £176 and £162, respectively.  
The variables used to explain the economic factors are: for care home 
competitiveness the average level of LA competition as measured by a 10-km 
distance- and time-weighted HHI for each care home in the LA10 (an inverse 
measure of competition, HHI = 0 implying perfect competition and HHI = 1 implying 
monopoly); for LA market power the LA power index, with 1 representing low 
power and 3 high power; for the quality effect the percent of homes rated as 
excellent in the LA11; and for economies of scale the average size of care homes in 
each LA.  
The additional control variables are: the percentage of the total population that are 
over state pension age (as a measure of demand); the percentage of the older 
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population claiming attendance allowance (as a measure of needs); the percentage 
of care homes in the LA which are primarily aimed at clients with dementia, that are 
nursing homes and are in the voluntary sector, respectively; and then two dummy 
variables to indicate whether the LA was a London borough and whether the 
observation came from 2010.  
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
Empirical specification 
From the conceptual framework outlined in section 2 we can estimate the following 
model of the fees gap: 
ܨܩ௝௪ ሺൌ ݌ௌி െ ݌௅஺ሻ ൌ ܨܩ௝௪൫ ௝ܰ௪ ǡ ௝ܺ௪ ǡ ݍ௝௪ ǡ ܤ௝௪ ǡ ߪ௝௪൯ ൅ ߜ௝ ൅ ௝߳௪ ሺ ?ሻ 
 
Where ܨܩ is the fees gap for LA ݆ (݆ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ? ? ?) in wave ݓ (ݓ ൌ  ?ǡ  ?), which is 
the difference between the average self-funder price and the average LA-funded 
price, and this is a function of competition, ܰ, LA market power, ܺ, quality, ݍ, 
economies of scale, ܤ, and ߪ, which is a vector of market related characteristics 
(demand, needs levels, etc.). ߜ௝ is a time-invariant, LA-specific, error term and 
௝߳௪the classical disturbance, both assumed to have mean and variance of zero, and 
the latter error term is assumed to be uncorrelated with the time-invariant error 
term and the regressors of interest. Initially we estimate equation ሺ ?ሻ using OLS, 
therefore assuming that the error terms are not correlated over time. We then 
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estimate the model using random effects GLS to allow for the panel nature of the 
data.  
We estimate models on both the imputed and non-imputed (casewise deletion) 
data, the latter for comparison. Estimations on the imputed data set used ZƵďŝŶ ?Ɛ
rules to calculate coefficients and standard errors and were undertaken using the 
multiple imputation (MI) suite of commands available in Stata 13. 
Our hypotheses suggest that following relationships will be found: 
డிீడே ൏  ?ǡడிீడ௑ ൐ ?ǡడிீడ௤ ൐  ?, and డிீడ஻ ൐  ?.  
Results 
Main findings 
Results of the estimation of equation ሺ ?ሻ by using the non- ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ?ĚĂƚĂĂƌĞ
presented in Table 4, whilst the results using data drawn from multiple imputation 
are presented in Table 5. Standard errors in the results from Table 4 are 
bootstrapped (500 reps), and in all estimations (Tables 4 and 5) standard errors 
allow for correlation between observations from the same LA. In Table 4 the OLS 
cross section results for the basic and adjusted fees gap are presented in columns 1 
and 2, whilst columns 3 and 4 present random effects GLS for the basic and 
adjusted fees gap, respectively. The Breusch-Pagan test of the null hypothesis that 
there are no random effects present in the model is rejected, whilst the Hausman 
test confirms that the random effects model outlined in equation ሺ ?ሻ is correctly 
specified. The results show that competition strongly reduces the fees gap (given 
the inverse measuring of competition from HHI) and also provide some indication 
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that LA market power increases the fees gap (although noting the opposite result 
when looking at the raw, unadjusted fees gap). 
The results of Table 4 could be due to the large level of missing observations. 
Therefore Table 5 presents estimations of random effects GLS using multiple 
imputation (20 imputations). Each of the columns presents the results using 
different dependent variables: 5 the basic fees gap; 6 the adjusted; 7 and 8 adjusted 
assuming 85 per cent and 95 per cent occupancy, respectively; and 9 adjusted using 
minimum and maximum prices for LA-funded and self-funded residents, 
respectively. 
We test for the significance of random effects in MI regressions by applying the 
Breusch-Pagan test for random effects on each imputation. Irrespective of the fees-
gap estimated, for all 20 imputations the null hypothesis of the B-P test was 
rejected (all at the 1 per cent level) suggesting panel effects are very important in 
the model. 
Our preferred specification are the results in column 6. Looking at these, it is clear 
that competition plays a very important role in the fees gap: at the means, a 1 per 
cent increase in competition would decrease the fees gap by £37 per week. LA 
market power has a positive effect on the fees gap: a LA that has high market 
power has a fees gap that is £40 per week higher than other LAs with less market 
power. No significant effect on the fees gap was found for average care home size, 
but quality does have a small, significant positive effect on the fees gap: a one 
percentage point rise in the number of homes rated as excellent would increase the 
fees gap by £1.74 per week.   
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Looking at the other variables included in the model, increases in demand and 
needs both significantly reduce the fees gap to a large extent, whilst increased 
prevalence of nursing homes and not-for-profit homes significantly increases the 
fees gap. Finally, there is also a significant positive year effect with the fees gap 
being £36 per week higher in 2010 compared to 2008. 
Most of these results are robust to changes in the fees gap that is analysed. 
However, the positive effect of LA market power is not significant when looking at 
the basic fees gap in column 5. There is also some suggestion that random effects 
are not consistent for columns 8 and 9, perhaps giving some indication of an issue 
with endogeneity. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
Interaction between competition and LA market power 
We also interacted competition and LA market power (where low and medium 
market power LAs are combined together) using the adjusted fees gap model in 
column 6. These results (not presented in full) do not change compared to those in 
Table 5 with the same significant results found. Of particular interest are the 
marginal effects of LA market power given competition, and vice versa. These are 
presented in Table 6. The first column shows that the effect on the fees gap of high 
LA market power rises as competition increases (i.e. as HHI decreases). Indeed, the 
results suggest that for LAs with low levels of competition high LA market power 
has no discernable impact on the fees gap. The results from the second column 
suggest that the effect of competition on the fees gap is only significant with low or 
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medium LA market power. However, a chi-squared test of equality finds that the 
difference of the competitive effect on the fees gap for differing levels of LA market 
power is not significant (ߩ = 0.15). 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
Specification checks 
We performed a number of specification checks. First, there could be 
misspecification of the data if we have incorrectly assumed that the fees gap cannot 
be negative in value. However, a random effects Tobit, with the fees gap censored 
at zero, does not alter the results. Second, including the excluded LA observations 
in the analysis, and thus assuming that there is a self-funder portion of the market 
in these LAs, also does not change the results. 
Third, the index of LA market power is highly correlated with the measure of 
competition. This is likely to be the case given the nature of the problem examined, 
but this could affect the results. An uncorrelated measure of LA market power, a 
ranking based on the percentage of all schools rated as good or excellent in an LA 
(so assuming that good LA performance in one area is indicative of better 
performance in others), was used as an alternative but no significant effect was 
found. 
Discussion 
The extent of the gap in fees paid by LA-funded and self-funded residents is well 
known and is mainly attributed to the dominant purchasing power of LAs. However, 
there is no existing evidence of average self-funded fees paid at the LA-level and 
subsequently nor do any reasons as to what causes the gap in fees paid by self-
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funded and for LA-funded residents. This analysis presents the first attempt to do 
so. We estimated the average self-funded fee for an LA for 2008 and 2010 using 
data on average (weekly) resident price and average (weekly) LA-funded resident 
cost. We then assessed the causes of the fees gap between self-funded and LA-
funded resident fees. 
The estimates for average (weekly) self-funded price have controlled for out-of-
area placements, nursing care contributions, missing price data, and high 
proportions of LA-funded residents in an LA. Nevertheless the estimates will only be 
as good as the data used and a number of simplifying assumptions were made. For 
example, we have used data for 2009 out-of-area placements, and so have assumed 
that out-of-area placements were exactly the same over the period 2008-2010. A 
more likely concern is that LA-cost data may be skewed by the inclusion (or 
exclusion) of overhead costs which differ amongst LAs. The use of regional average 
LA-cost fees in our preferred self-funded fees estimates are hoped to solve at least 
some of this problem.  
Taking the data limitations into account, we find that LA market power significantly 
increases the fees gap for those LAs with the highest market power. The size of the 
effect on the fees gap is estimated to be around £40 per week, or 28 per cent of the 
mean weekly fees gap. Results of interactions between LA market power and 
competition show that this effect is mitigated when the level of competition in the 
local market is weak. This is indicative of LA market power being generated from 
the supply side of the market (care homes competing for LA-funded residents) 
rather than the demand side (the ratio of LA-funded to self-funded residents). 
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Nonetheless, the fees gap will persist in a healthy, competitive, local market 
because of the market power of LAs.  
Care home market power is also extremely important in explaining the fees gap. 
We find a negative effect of competition on the fees gap suggesting, in absolute 
terms, that the impact of increased competition is more strongly felt on self-funder 
fees than LA-funded fees. It is likely that information asymmetries allow care homes 
to employ price discrimination. A potential alternative explanation for this finding is 
ƚŚĂƚĐĂƌĞŚŽŵĞƐĂƌĞ ‘ƉƵƐŚĞĚ ? ?ĂƚůĞĂƐƚƚŽƐome extent, into using their market 
power to extract rents because LA market power is so strong. In other words, there 
ŝƐĂ ‘ŬŶŽĐŬ-ŽŶ ?ĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶƚŚĞĨĞĞƐŐĂƉŽĨ>ŵĂƌŬĞƚƉŽǁĞƌĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ ?ŽƌŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨ ?
price discrimination. Potentially this could be the case since many care home 
providers care more about the quality of service they provide and the outcomes of 
their residents as opposed to pure profit-making (Kendall, 2001; Knapp et al., 2001; 
Matosevic et al., 2008). However, the inclusion of an interaction between 
competition and LA market power showed some indication that the impact of care 
home market power on the fees gap depends on a lack of LA market power which 
weakens the veracity of this argument.  
Our results also found a small positive effect of quality on the fees gap. Using our 
preferred specification, the fees gap for an LA with the 75th percentile of excellent 
rated homes (22.9 per cent) would be just over £23 a week higher than an LA with 
the 25th percentile of excellent rated homes (9.6 per cent).  
Increases in demand, either from a larger population base or greater needs, 
reduces the fees-gap; this suggests that self-funded fees are more responsive to 
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changes in market conditions than fees that are LA-funded. Our measure of 
economies of scale, average care home size, did not increase the fees gap. 
However, larger proportions of nursing homes did increase the fees gap. This is 
found in spite of controlling for weekly nursing care payments and so could 
potentially be capturing an economies of scale effect as nursing homes tend to be 
larger on average than residential care homes (Laing & Buisson, 2012). We 
additionally found that larger numbers of voluntary sector homes increase the fees 
gap. This is unsurprising given that the voluntary sector generally have higher costs 
and a greater level of quality (Grabowski and Hirth, 2003; Mukamel et al., 2005; 
Forder and Allan, 2014). 
We also find a significant increase in the fees gap over time, even after controlling 
for inflation. There are a few potential competing theories as to what this is 
capturing. The first is that it is capturing the squeeze on LA expenditure and 
number of residents supported  at this time (Fernandez and Snell, 2012; Fernandez 
et al., 2013). An alternative to this is that care homes used their market power to 
charge self-funded residents more, or some combination of the two. A third 
alternative is that it is capturing a quality effect from the availability of quality 
ratings, which were first made publicly available in May 2008 and so the market 
adapted to their availability by 2010. A fourth alternative is that an economies of 
scale effect is being captured, with care homes potentially becoming increasingly 
concerned with making sure they optimise resident levels as the economic 
conditions deteriorated so greatly at this time.   
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These results shed light on the implications that the government austerity 
programme has had for local care homes markets. Funding reductions to local 
government have resulted in LAs using their market power to reduce, or not raise, 
the fees paid to providers, further adding to financial pressures that care homes are 
facing. To the extent that care homes have market power over the private segment 
of the market has further led to increases to self-ĨƵŶĚĞƌƐ ?ĨĞĞƐĂŶĚĂƉŽůĂƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
services in local markets (Humphries et al., 2016). The viability of care home supply 
also becomes a concern, particularly in relatively poorer areas where there are 
larger numbers of LA-funded residents (County Councils Network and LaingBuisson, 
2015).  
Reforms to social care funding were included in the Care Act 2014, but were 
subsequently postponed until April 2020 (Department of Health, 2015). Included in 
the reforms weƌĞĂ ‘ĐĂƉ ?ŽŶĐĂƌĞĐŽƐts and an increase in the means-test threshold. 
Any reforms to the funding of social care that include these measures could lead to 
an increased cost of residential care to the public purse. The result of these changes 
would be the increased bargaining power of local authorities as more people qualify 
for public support (Hancock et al., 2013). Given the former, LAs would likely to be 
increasingly squeezed on reducing costs for residential care; given the latter, LAs 
could be able to push down the price they pay for placements even further.  
There are a number of weaknesses to this analysis. The data limitations have 
already been outlined and specification checks have addressed some potential 
problems. However, a further issue that we have not resolved fully is endogeneity; 
the price paid by the LA to support a resident or by self-funded residents affects 
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quality and competition levels in the local market. Future work could attempt to 
resolve this issue with the use of instruments for competition and quality. However, 
finding effective instruments that affect competition and quality but not price is 
likely to prove difficult at such an aggregated level of data.  
A potentially more prudent route for future work would be to use price and other 
data from a sample of care homes and examine market power at the care home 
level. However, examining LA power at this level may prove difficult with a sample 
of care homes from (potentially) only a handful of LAs.  
 
1 Gross spending by LAs on social care has fallen by 9 per cent in real terms between 2009/10 and 
2014/15 as a result of reduced central government funding (Humphries et al., 2016). 
2 A third, minor, stream, consists of wholly NHS-funded residents who meet continuing care criteria. 
This stream accounts for around 8 per cent of all placements. We ignore this demand stream since 
pricing decisions will be based not just on care homes markets but also on hospital markets as local 
CCGs pay for continuing care. However, the implications of these placements on the prices 
estimated is considered in the analysis that follows. 
3 /ĨƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞŽĨĂĐĂƌĞŚŽŵĞƉůĂĐĞǁĂƐŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ ‘ƵƐƵĂů ?ƉƌŝĐĞĂƚŚŝƌĚƉĂƌƚǇǁĂƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽ
pay the appropriate top-up, usually a relative. 
4 However, self-funding residents also include those who have assets just above the means-test 
threshold, and this latter group will not want to, or necessarily be able to, pay high fees. Also, LA-
funded residents can have their fees topped up by a third party.   
5 See Allan and Forder (2015) for details on the matching process within and between years. 
6 We excluded City of London as it had no care homes and amalgamated the Isles of Scilly with 
Cornwall. 
7 We used the pairwise matching method (pmm) for 20 imputations using the following variables: 
percentage of the population that is above state pension age, total care home places, average LA 
cost, the percentage of homes rated with an excellent rating, the average size of a care home, 
pension credit uptake, attendance allowance uptake, the average LA care home place price, a 
dummy variable indicating if the LA was a London borough, and the percentage of homes in each LA 
that were nursing homes, in the voluntary sector and have residents with dementia as their primary 
clients, respectively. The data were imputed across the two waves with a wave dummy included in 
the imputation model. 
8 We performed a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy with the data 
demonstrating a value of 0.629. This suggests the data had a mediocre level of common variance but 
was suitable for PCA.  
9 The two waves of data are used together for the PCA. All the variables included were normalised to 
have a mean of 0 and variance of 1. 
10 For an explanation of this measure of HHI, see Forder and Allan (2014). 
11 Care homes were rated by the CQC during this period and could attain a rating of poor, adequate, 
good or excellent.  
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Table 1: PCA of LA market power indicators 
Variables PC1 PC2 PC3 
Non-CHG (%) 0.574 0.596 -0.561 
Total LA homes 0.622 0.128 0.772 
Pension Credit (%) -0.532 0.793 0.298 
Eigenvalue 1.82 0.70 0.48 














































Local Authorities n Mean S.D. Min 5th pc Median 95th pc Max 
Non-imputed data         
Basic 138 195.51 139.88 15.21 29.33 177.13 517.09 711.11 
Adjusted 136 180.37 143.41 0.24 16.36 145.34 461.68 805.05 
Adjusted (85% Occ.) 136 193.79 155.10 0.27 17.72 156.69 510.18 852.46 
Adjusted (95% Occ.) 136 170.05 134.72 0.22 15.33 137.99 437.87 766.88 
Adjusted (min/max) 133 173.48 138.20 3.55 18.75 142.48 445.07 823.68 
Imputed data         
Basic 5,800 162.14 146.33 15.21 15.21 117.01 516.50 711.11 
Adjusted 5,800 162.42 146.51 0.24 7.54 110.08 459.23 805.05 
Adjusted (85% Occ.) 5,800 176.43 156.97 0.27 8.06 115.57 485.70 852.46 
Adjusted (95% Occ.) 5,800 151.90 139.09 0.22 0.22 103.26 437.87 766.88 
















Local Authorities (n=290) 
 
Mean S.D Min Max 
Economic factors     
Average Competition (HHI) 0.038     0.030    0.010     0.183 
LA power index 2.03 0.81 1 3 
Quality (Excellent %) 17.27    11.10    0     62.5 
Average care home size 38.69     9.12    25.06    99.75 
Control factors     
Older population (%) 18.78 4.01 7.97 29.97 
Attendance Allowance (%) 13.61 2.41 7.02 20.28 
Primary client: Dementia (%) 15.03 8.80 0 50 
Nursing home (%) 40.12     14.73    8.20        100 
Voluntary sector (%) 14.71     12.35          0          75 
London (Yes = 1) 0.19 0.39      0 1 




Table 4: Results using non-imputed data 
 1 Basic CS 2 Adjusted CS 3 Basic RE  4 Adjusted RE 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Economic factors         
Average Competition (Log HHI) 70.88*** 24.71 61.13*** 22.71 80.48*** 24.92 72.48*** 20.91 
LA power index: Low 61.98** 31.05 21.62 29.62 56.29* 31.68 17.37 25.84 
LA power index: High 40.78 29.42 44.34** 20.62 38.08 27.81 33.12* 19.20 
Quality (Excellent %) 0.468 1.266 1.359 0.984 0.958 1.208 1.621 1.017 
Average care home size 0.457 1.965 1.715 1.743 0.284 1.933 1.518 1.636 
Control factors         
Older population (%) -13.37*** 4.594 -18.92*** 3.237 -14.50*** 4.045 -19.58*** 3.396 
Attendance Allowance (%) -8.114 7.714 -15.92*** 5.663 -4.803 7.473 -13.19** 5.419 
Primary client: Dementia (%) 1.034 1.745 1.483 1.390 0.953 1.669 1.385 1.555 
Nursing home (%) 0.238 1.007 1.052 0.888 0.499 1.047 0.892 0.867 
Voluntary sector (%) 0.221 1.242 3.791*** 0.907 -0.223 1.257 3.616*** 0.934 
London (Yes = 1) 87.38** 39.70 16.17 29.09 90.37** 40.01 19.78 30.06 
Year 61.53*** 18.19 59.19*** 14.23 63.36*** 18.52 57.55*** 14.97 
         
Constant 658.95*** 150.38 678.67*** 120.90 664.87*** 125.35 713.88*** 121.31 
N (clusters)  138 (105)  136 (99)  138 (105)  136 (99)  
R2 0.445  0.678  0.439  0.674  
Wald     100.46***  143.48***  
Breusch-Pagan     9.09***  2.76**  
Hausman     12.73NS  11.73NS  








Table 5: Results using multiple imputation 




 5 Basic RE 6 Adjusted RE 7 Adjusted RE (85% 
Occ.) 
8 Adjusted RE (95% 
Occ.) 
9 Adjusted RE 
(min/max) 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Economic factors           
Average Competition (Log HHI) 48.56*** 16.27 37.35*** 14.44 42.67*** 16.01 36.86*** 13.68 29.57** 14.12 
LA power index: Low 4.64 18.66 7.00 15.68 5.63 17.71 4.71 15.02 -0.44 15.32 
LA power index: High 30.21 19.89 39.94** 17.00 39.97** 17.73 38.29** 16.42 46.58*** 17.83 
Quality (Excellent %) 2.056** 1.039 1.736** 0.772 1.718* 0.912 1.625** 0.780 2.142** 0.863 
Average care home size -0.297 1.698 0.986 1.289 1.252 1.326 0.715 1.168 0.020 1.242 
Control factors           
Older population (%) -15.08*** 3.09 -14.54*** 2.71 -16.11*** 2.83 -13.57*** 2.61 -12.32*** 2.76 
Attendance Allowance (%) -15.56*** 4.70 -18.66*** 4.19 -19.06*** 4.61 -18.02*** 4.07 -20.79*** 4.08 
Primary client: Dementia (%) 0.822 1.153 0.931 1.029 1.230 1.093 0.784 0.952 -0.932 0.991 
Nursing home (%) 0.880 1.005 2.088** 0.928 2.175** 0.947 2.066** 0.928 2.431*** 0.870 
Voluntary sector (%) -0.759 0.939 2.095** 0.841 2.386** 1.006 2.028*** 0.751 1.747* 0.901 
London (Yes = 1) 67.55** 30.30 21.98 27.55 22.56 29.83 22.42 27.25 15.51 26.65 
Year 44.75*** 12.88 36.08*** 10.55 35.48*** 10.78 37.92*** 9.55 50.59*** 9.70 
           
Constant 718.91*** 116.10 585.34*** 88.36 631.36*** 95.75 562.83*** 84.20 573.66*** 77.75 
N (clusters) 290 (148)  290 (148)  290 (148)  290 (148)  290 (148)  
Imputations 20  20  20  20  20  
Average RVI 0.125  0.366  0.340  0.305  0.373  
Largest FMI 0.182  0.393  0.397  0.337  0.432  




Table 6: Marginal effects 
 LA market power (High)  Competition (Log HHI) 
Competition (Log HHI) Coefficient S.E. LA Market Power Coefficient S.E. 
Mean 39.17** 16.96 Low/Medium 46.98*** 16.50 
5th percentile 58.75** 27.55 High 24.33 19.32 
25th percentile 50.41** 21.60    
Median 42.74** 17.83    
75th percentile 28.32 18.70    
95th percentile 12.86 28.93    

























From equation (2) we know that the (average) self-funder price for LA j is equal to: 
௝ܲௌி ൌ ௉ೕି௡ೕ௉ೕಽಲሺଵି௡ೕሻ        ሺܣ ?ሻ 
Estimating ௝݊  is not straightforward. This is for two reasons. The first is that we need 
to know the total number of residents in care homes to be able to work out the 
proportion of residents that are LA-funded. The second is that LA-funded residents 
may be funded by one LA but located in another (out-of-area placements). The 
proportion of LA-funded residents located in LA ݆ is therefore calculated as: 
௝݊ ൌ  ? ே೔ೕ೥೔సభఋ஻ೕ      (ܣ ?ሻ 
Where ௜ܰ௝ is the number of LA-funded residents that are funded by LA ݅ and located 
in LA ݆, ߜ is the assumed occupancy rate, and ܤ௝is the total number of places in LA ݆.  
Information on total LA-funded resident numbers was taken from council-level unit 
costs reports for 2007/08 and 2009/10.1,2 To find the total number of LA-funded 
residents in the independent sector for each LA or region we assume that all 
residents in homes run by the public sector are LA-funded and that these homes have 
90% occupancy. We use figures provided by the CQC from 2009 on out-of area 
placements by each LA to assign LA-funded placements to the LA in which they are 
actually located.3  
The proportion of self-funded residents in independent care homes is not known. We 
therefore use data of the number of residents that are funded by LAs, which, when 
subtracted away from total places in a LA (weighted by occupancy rates), will leave 
the number of residents that are self-funded.4 We assume a 90% occupancy rate in 
all estimations, but as a sensitivity analysis we also assume 85% and 95% occupancy 
rates. 5 
                                                          
1 In two cases (Manchester and East Sussex) data on resident numbers and costs for 2010-11 are used 
due to there being no reported average cost for an LA-funded resident for 2009-10. 
2 We use 2007/08 and 2009/10 (rather than 2008/09 and 2010/11) resident number and cost data as 
the date of collection for costs is the 31st March of each financial year and so this data is closest to 
our price data. 
3 Hence, we assume that out-of-area placements remained constant over the period 2008-2010.  
4 Note that this does not allow for the small proportion of residents that are funded by the NHS. 
However, this problem is mitigated somewhat by varying the occupancy rate (although the issue of 
how wholly NHS-funded places affects the reported prices by care homes in the price data remains). 
In analysis not presented in the paper, we find that adjusting the occupancy rate to 100% does not 
markedly change the estimated self-pay price for a LA (except for the few LAs that have the issues 
described in section 3). 
5 At the regional level, regional occupancy rates are adapted from Laing & Buisson (2010), where the 
regions reported differ slightly from those used in this analysis. 
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The prices obtained from Laing & Buisson will include both third party top-ups made 
on top of the price paid by an LA and NHS funded nursing care payments. We are 
unable to deal with the former in our analysis, but we can attempt to solve the latter 
issue. We removed NHS funded nursing care payments that a certain proportion of 
nursing home residents receive using the following process (using 2010 as the 
example): in 2011/12 PCTs spent £488m on funded nursing care, which suggests that 
86,335 placements a year receive a weekly nursing care payment of £108.70. There 
were 186,601 nursing home places available in 2010. Assuming a 90% occupancy rate 
in nursing homes, the average weekly funded nursing care payment for every nursing 
home resident would be £55.88. We subtract this figure from the average price of a 
nursing home place for each care home. 
In addition, again using 2010 as the example, we excluded from the distribution 
analysis care homes reporting an average price per week over £2000 (n=9) and care 
homes with an average price below the (initial) 5th percentile of the regional price 
distribution for nursing and residential homes respectively (n=564). Prices are 
inflation adjusted to July 2012 terms. Finally, all price distributions are weighted by 
the size of the care homes (number of beds) so that the data is more representative 
of resident numbers. 
As an additional sensitivity check we also assume that the average price of a care 
home place is equal to the following: 
௝ܲ ൌ ߙ௝ ௝ܲ௠௔௫ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙ௝ሻ ௝ܲ௠௜௡  ሺܣ ?ሻ  
Where ݌௠௔௫ and ݌௠௜௡ are the average maximum and minimum price observed in 
each LA for a care home place, respectively. Assuming that ߙ௝ ൌ ൫ ? െ ௝݊൯ and 
substituting ሺܣ ?ሻ into ሺܣ ?ሻ we obtain the following alternative way to estimate the 
average self-funded price for each LA: 
௝ܲௌி ൌ ൫ଵି௡ೕ൯௉ೕ೘ೌೣା௡ೕሺ௉ೕ೘೔೙ି௉ೕಽಲሻሺଵି௡ೕሻ   ሺܣ ?ሻ 
  
Average cost per LA-funded resident in the independent sector is measured using the 
average cost of funding a LA resident in a care home provided by others for 2007/08 
and 2009/10 from council-level unit costs reports available from the Health and 
Social Care Information Centre (now NHS Digital). Costs are inflation adjusted to July 
2012 terms. The average cost per LA-funded resident located in LA j needs to be 
adjusted to reflect the issue of out-of-area placements discussed previously. This is 
calculated as: 
௝ܲ௅஺ ൌ ሺ ? ௉೔ಽಲே೔ೕሻ೥೔సభ ? ே೔ೕ೥೔సభ       ሺܣ ?ሻ 
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Where ௝ܲ௅஺ is the average cost per LA-funded resident in the independent sector for 
LA ݆ and ሺ ? ௜ܲ௅஺ ௜ܰ௝ሻ௭௜ୀଵ  is the total cost of LA-funded residents funded by each LA ݅ 
that are placed in a care home in LA ݆.6 
Table A1 presents for 2008 and 2010 by LA both the average and regional average 
cost per LA-funded resident in (non-LA provided) care homes once inflation and out-
of-area placements are taken into account. 
Table A2 presents by LA for 2008 and 2010 the basic average self-funded price for a 
place in a care home per week and the adjusted price, both taking into account 
inflation and in July 2012 terms. The adjusted price is calculated as follows: first, 
average regional costs were used in place of LA-level average costs; second, we 
trimmed the proportion of residents that are LA-funded, ௝݊ , to the 95th (5th) 
percentile for those LAs with high (low) ݊ ௝; finally, a predicted average price was used 
for LAs with 20% or more of care homes that did not report any price or that had a 
proportion of LA-funded residents below (above) the 5th (95th) percentile.7,8 
Table A3 presents the mean average self-funded price for the various estimations 
over the two waves. The basic average self-funder price is 5.1% higher on average 
than the adjusted average self-funder price, although the difference is not significant. 
The mean 85% occupancy rate, 95% occupancy rate, and min/max price estimations 
are respectively 1.5% higher, 1.0% lower and 3.2% lower than the mean 90% 
occupancy adjusted price, and for each the difference is significant, although only at 






                                                          
6 Therefore, the average cost per LA resident will differ from those found in council-level unit cost 
reports. 
7 The log of LA average price was regressed on the log of costs, the proportion of self-funders 
(assuming a 90% occupancy rate), and the log of average house price. This is estimated for all LAs 
within the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution of the proportion of self-funders and that have 
more than 80% of care homes with care home price data. 
8 This final stage of adjusting the price is not included in the empirical analysis of the fees gap because 
of the use of multiple imputation for missing fees gaps. As such, the adjusted price here differs from 
that used to estimate the average fees gap for LAs. The differences in the two estimated adjusted 
prices are minor (those presented here are 2.2% lower on average than the adjusted price used in the 
main empirical analysis), but a test of equality is rejected at the 10% level. Using this adjusted price in 
the initial, non-imputed, fees gap analysis does not markedly affect the results found.  
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Table A1: Average and regional average cost per LA-funded resident 










Barking and Dagenham £580.89 £591.13 £503.35 £609.26 
Barnet £579.77 £591.13 £617.31 £609.26 
Barnsley £459.09 £415.23 £458.70 £450.66 
Bath and North East 
Somerset 
£529.17 £481.33 £503.30 £505.13 
Bedford £526.81 £518.73 £530.99 £523.92 
Bexley £568.81 £591.13 £622.96 £609.26 
Birmingham £455.69 £449.48 £550.21 £493.67 
Blackburn with Darwen £460.19 £436.76 £461.48 £453.77 
Blackpool £406.16 £436.76 £403.41 £453.77 
Bolton £422.29 £436.76 £424.93 £453.77 
Bournemouth £507.85 £481.33 £520.65 £505.13 
Bracknell Forest £589.07 £505.64 £565.03 £539.41 
Bradford £424.68 £415.23 £498.08 £450.66 
Brent £529.16 £591.13 £790.61 £609.26 
Brighton and Hove £577.63 £505.64 £554.46 £539.41 
Bristol, City of £562.48 £481.33 £554.06 £505.13 
Bromley £570.60 £591.13 £611.53 £609.26 
Buckinghamshire £572.62 £505.64 £631.51 £539.41 
Bury £533.80 £436.76 £423.63 £453.77 
Calderdale £413.89 £415.23 £394.15 £450.66 
Cambridgeshire £421.09 £518.73 £479.95 £523.92 
Camden £595.89 £591.13 £657.54 £609.26 
Central Bedfordshire £528.33 £518.73 £545.48 £523.92 
Cheshire East £460.76 £436.76 £439.50 £453.77 
Cheshire West & 
Chester 
£461.82 £436.76 £483.85 £453.77 
Cornwall & Scilly Isles £411.98 £481.33 £412.26 £505.13 
Coventry £487.90 £449.48 £461.21 £493.67 
Croydon £506.62 £591.13 £494.45 £609.26 
Cumbria £518.55 £436.76 £511.00 £453.77 
Darlington £434.53 £454.15 £481.18 £504.70 
Derby £432.42 £435.10 £437.78 £444.29 
Derbyshire £465.27 £435.10 £440.40 £444.29 
Devon £462.60 £481.33 £522.67 £505.13 
Doncaster £474.56 £415.23 £421.75 £450.66 
Dorset £516.96 £481.33 £583.92 £505.13 
Dudley £449.85 £449.48 £464.89 £493.67 
Durham £481.43 £454.15 £539.81 £504.70 
Ealing £731.96 £591.13 £578.41 £609.26 
East Riding of Yorkshire £391.77 £415.23 £424.92 £450.66 
East Sussex £426.75 £505.64 £564.70 £539.41 
Enfield £528.44 £591.13 £566.29 £609.26 
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Essex £578.10 £518.73 £571.13 £523.92 
Gateshead £441.11 £454.15 £543.99 £504.70 
Gloucestershire £481.03 £481.33 £466.72 £505.13 
Greenwich £592.77 £591.13 £640.37 £609.26 
Hackney £579.75 £591.13 £631.70 £609.26 
Halton £403.13 £436.76 £401.50 £453.77 
Hammersmith and 
Fulham 
£593.37 £591.13 £626.53 £609.26 
Hampshire £447.80 £505.64 £465.25 £539.41 
Haringey £557.42 £591.13 £549.77 £609.26 
Harrow £585.62 £591.13 £596.96 £609.26 
Hartlepool £460.14 £454.15 £445.79 £504.70 
Havering £541.19 £591.13 £557.88 £609.26 
Herefordshire, County 
of 
£526.57 £449.48 £539.25 £493.67 
Hertfordshire £565.67 £518.73 £597.84 £523.92 
Hillingdon £634.70 £591.13 £598.61 £609.26 
Hounslow £619.38 £591.13 £653.25 £609.26 
Isle of Wight £397.29 £505.64 £452.77 £539.41 
Islington £609.95 £591.13 £586.43 £609.26 
Kensington and 
Chelsea 
£675.99 £591.13 £802.51 £609.26 
Kent £453.55 £505.64 £471.74 £539.41 
Kingston upon Hull, 
City of 
£395.85 £415.23 £418.34 £450.66 
Kingston upon Thames £630.13 £591.13 £610.81 £609.26 
Kirklees £422.91 £415.23 £451.01 £450.66 
Knowsley £418.14 £436.76 £433.27 £453.77 
Lambeth £626.73 £591.13 £648.24 £609.26 
Lancashire £436.83 £436.76 £473.72 £453.77 
Leeds £336.94 £415.23 £467.23 £450.66 
Leicester £395.86 £435.10 £384.20 £444.29 
Leicestershire £415.68 £435.10 £406.15 £444.29 
Lewisham £582.11 £591.13 £594.33 £609.26 
Lincolnshire £452.36 £435.10 £439.93 £444.29 
Liverpool £337.38 £436.76 £370.53 £453.77 
Luton £490.93 £518.73 £532.66 £523.92 
Manchester £422.40 £436.76 £425.57 £453.77 
Medway £458.53 £505.64 £454.01 £539.41 
Merton £529.41 £591.13 £552.92 £609.26 
Middlesbrough £458.57 £454.15 £510.58 £504.70 
Milton Keynes £514.16 £505.64 £497.76 £539.41 
Newcastle upon Tyne £447.54 £454.15 £487.29 £504.70 
Newham £552.62 £591.13 £580.50 £609.26 
Norfolk £389.57 £518.73 £422.43 £523.92 
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North East Lincolnshire £402.08 £415.23 £522.23 £450.66 
North Lincolnshire £423.72 £415.23 £400.06 £450.66 
North Somerset £482.24 £481.33 £427.26 £505.13 
North Tyneside £413.64 £454.15 £482.33 £504.70 
North Yorkshire £422.32 £415.23 £463.78 £450.66 
Northamptonshire £450.84 £435.10 £515.50 £444.29 
Northumberland £479.65 £454.15 £502.74 £504.70 
Nottingham £382.42 £435.10 £425.19 £444.29 
Nottinghamshire £418.87 £435.10 £431.45 £444.29 
Oldham £369.23 £436.76 £435.76 £453.77 
Oxfordshire £615.58 £505.64 £765.87 £539.41 
Peterborough £430.44 £518.73 £468.99 £523.92 
Plymouth £441.77 £481.33 £475.69 £505.13 
Poole £588.12 £481.33 £634.28 £505.13 
Portsmouth £453.53 £505.64 £456.63 £539.41 
Reading £585.57 £505.64 £566.71 £539.41 
Redbridge £597.43 £591.13 £604.01 £609.26 
Redcar and Cleveland £370.31 £454.15 £517.09 £504.70 
Richmond upon 
Thames 
£625.20 £591.13 £644.93 £609.26 
Rochdale £414.69 £436.76 £421.26 £453.77 
Rotherham £466.91 £415.23 £436.33 £450.66 
Rutland £268.30 £435.10 £469.07 £444.29 
Salford £438.95 £436.76 £474.32 £453.77 
Sandwell £451.79 £449.48 £501.32 £493.67 
Sefton £444.64 £436.76 £519.24 £453.77 
Sheffield £430.53 £415.23 £457.54 £450.66 
Shropshire £428.14 £449.48 £480.34 £493.67 
Slough £416.43 £505.64 £523.11 £539.41 
Solihull £447.70 £449.48 £484.68 £493.67 
Somerset £478.53 £481.33 £503.84 £505.13 
South Gloucestershire £606.20 £481.33 £579.06 £505.13 
South Tyneside £429.63 £454.15 £495.53 £504.70 
Southampton £401.04 £505.64 £413.39 £539.41 
Southend-on-Sea £526.89 £518.73 £483.37 £523.92 
Southwark £636.10 £591.13 £684.49 £609.26 
St. Helens £433.35 £436.76 £448.35 £453.77 
Staffordshire £410.62 £449.48 £512.32 £493.67 
Stockport £432.71 £436.76 £444.11 £453.77 
Stockton-on-Tees £453.83 £454.15 £440.74 £504.70 
Stoke-on-Trent £422.49 £449.48 £448.35 £493.67 
Suffolk £599.41 £518.73 £478.06 £523.92 
Sunderland £456.89 £454.15 £512.24 £504.70 
Surrey £600.31 £505.64 £618.14 £539.41 
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Sutton £553.86 £591.13 £588.09 £609.26 
Swindon £519.84 £481.33 £512.42 £505.13 
Tameside £461.06 £436.76 £462.82 £453.77 
Telford and Wrekin £468.43 £449.48 £482.71 £493.67 
Thurrock £527.48 £518.73 £561.15 £523.92 
Torbay £396.82 £481.33 £440.65 £505.13 
Tower Hamlets £544.67 £591.13 £561.18 £609.26 
Trafford £426.79 £436.76 £440.84 £453.77 
Wakefield £430.34 £415.23 £435.96 £450.66 
Walsall £443.89 £449.48 £552.36 £493.67 
Waltham Forest £578.41 £591.13 £590.57 £609.26 
Wandsworth £687.27 £591.13 £658.32 £609.26 
Warrington £443.18 £436.76 £494.06 £453.77 
Warwickshire £437.15 £449.48 £479.81 £493.67 
West Berkshire £485.69 £505.64 £471.78 £539.41 
West Sussex £581.09 £505.64 £568.15 £539.41 
Westminster £659.12 £591.13 £767.22 £609.26 
Wigan £440.94 £436.76 £461.00 £453.77 
Wiltshire £496.40 £481.33 £595.61 £505.13 
Windsor and 
Maidenhead 
£541.21 £505.64 £540.73 £539.41 
Wirral £516.99 £436.76 £457.76 £453.77 
Wokingham £575.46 £505.64 £640.88 £539.41 
Wolverhampton £438.80 £449.48 £465.39 £493.67 
Worcestershire £481.92 £449.48 £432.94 £493.67 














Table A2: Estimated average (weekly) self-funded resident fees 
Local Authority 2008 
Basic                  Adjusted  
2010 
Basic                  Adjusted 
Barking and Dagenham* £649.09 £404.31 £1,136.51 £1,023.34 
Barnet £832.90 £815.99 £871.65 £881.28 
Barnsley*+ £300.60 £450.38 £418.97 £430.56 
Bath and North East 
Somerset* 
£620.61 £687.71 £752.83 £747.99 
Bedford* £559.97 £541.30 £670.89 £679.26 
Bexley* £505.47 £457.06 £843.26 £872.51 
Birmingham* £559.72 £477.24 £517.24 £591.72 
Blackburn with Darwen*+ £382.11 £424.41 £399.25 £407.62 
Blackpool*+ £402.66 £374.20 £435.15 £386.38 
Bolton £471.79 £453.12 £520.73 £493.38 
Bournemouth* £647.35 £616.63 £720.04 £729.88 
Bracknell Forest £702.11 £611.54 £799.94 £817.94 
Bradford £581.72 £471.64 £594.41 £632.57 
Brent+ N/A N/A £756.54 £903.12 
Brighton and Hove £575.80 £672.64 £698.24 £720.11 
Bristol, City of* £506.86 £572.38 £667.15 £704.46 
Bromley* £717.99 £675.92 £889.32 £891.38 
Buckinghamshire* £784.53 £808.29 £805.20 £869.55 
Bury* £362.21 £517.55 £538.28 £510.37 
Calderdale* £489.88 £523.54 £552.47 £507.70 
Cambridgeshire* £740.20 £570.64 £783.88 £735.18 
Camden* £2,077.98 £2,118.79 £1,368.65 £1,414.31 
Central Bedfordshire* £674.14 £603.77 £758.12 £800.45 
Cheshire East £661.16 £681.47 £731.83 £720.84 
Cheshire West & Chester £542.68 £582.46 £642.30 £681.84 
Cornwall & Scilly Isles* £679.05 £615.36 £678.29 £625.84 
Coventry £472.17 £467.41 £648.96 £615.35 
Croydon*+ £697.35 £548.09 £822.40 £683.08 
Cumbria*+ £458.12 £614.41 £526.76 £555.93 
Darlington*+ £405.70 £448.32 £453.35 £475.16 
Derby* £432.46 £476.54 £540.28 £532.14 
Derbyshire*+ £388.83 £591.07 £526.21 £523.86 
Devon+ £585.70 £556.85 £583.80 £592.90 
Doncaster* £401.20 £473.59 £495.51 £471.46 
Dorset*+ £663.83 £741.25 £682.93 £710.50 
Dudley*+ £420.89 £482.24 £430.00 £388.80 
Durham* £490.41 £363.62 £476.18 £521.00 
Ealing* £331.16 £678.94 £842.25 £808.21 
East Riding of Yorkshire £493.78 £573.16 £544.13 £507.99 
East Sussex+ £635.39 £752.10 £665.57 £681.18 
Enfield £714.16 £565.79 £943.25 £877.08 
Essex £515.46 £601.91 £665.43 £705.63 
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Gateshead*+ £470.77 £372.92 £431.65 £517.08 
Gloucestershire £679.78 £615.10 £898.10 £861.71 
Greenwich* £718.82 £512.94 £1,016.89 £1,070.94 
Hackney+ N/A N/A £794.96 £970.20 
Halton*+ £411.84 £439.84 £530.85 £408.02 
Hammersmith and 
Fulham* 
£1,173.51 £1,056.81 £1,074.50 £1,090.92 
Hampshire £728.11 £871.47 £819.81 £771.30 
Haringey £912.70 £834.81 £960.18 £906.62 
Harrow* £720.85 £664.07 £775.69 £766.43 
Hartlepool*+ £334.44 £402.01 £488.77 £413.37 
Havering* £677.81 £521.04 £733.96 £685.65 
Herefordshire, County of* £466.09 £663.64 £577.56 £724.61 
Hertfordshire* £710.93 £653.53 £830.75 £917.70 
Hillingdon £619.94 £589.32 £819.56 £737.52 
Hounslow £1,140.10 £662.73 £1,027.72 £1,068.49 
Isle of Wight £671.86 £545.40 £630.95 £553.29 
Islington+ N/A N/A £3,643.15 £1,700.13 
Kensington and Chelsea*+ £923.47 £1,222.57 £856.82 £1,464.92 
Kent £642.58 £621.30 £745.01 £681.04 
Kingston upon Hull, City 
of*+ 
£473.01 £211.45 £438.82 £368.60 
Kingston upon Thames £722.95 £686.66 £850.75 £871.80 
Kirklees £496.89 £524.73 £595.14 £595.45 
Knowsley*+ £414.99 £373.98 £803.82 £798.23 
Lambeth N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Lancashire £470.66 £603.38 £542.92 £562.29 
Leeds* £784.40 £509.41 £665.45 £678.08 
Leicester £599.05 £451.70 £603.46 £548.03 
Leicestershire* £554.56 £607.50 £627.29 £598.12 
Lewisham+ N/A N/A £857.46 £953.27 
Lincolnshire £467.57 £507.60 £536.74 £531.87 
Liverpool* £610.21 £213.09 £626.42 £469.11 
Luton* £561.69 £433.71 £790.35 £614.06 
Manchester £503.25 £431.84 £533.39 £500.98 
Medway £662.07 £583.94 £1,076.48 £836.32 
Merton*+ £894.68 £733.30 £993.17 £961.27 
Middlesbrough*+ £397.47 £395.46 £427.45 £432.76 
Milton Keynes* £749.49 £531.89 £923.12 £888.08 
Newcastle upon Tyne*+ £437.92 £459.14 £447.12 £424.52 
Newham*+ £1,111.48 £269.51 £748.65 £719.86 
Norfolk* £578.91 £599.49 £688.95 £602.32 
North East Lincolnshire+ £437.98 £415.48 £372.79 £434.74 
North Lincolnshire*+ £389.37 £395.39 £452.68 £406.41 
North Somerset* £512.84 £627.37 £706.90 £639.35 
North Tyneside*+ £437.46 £496.43 £478.40 £463.94 
North Yorkshire*+ £596.12 £841.47 £617.18 £650.56 
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Northamptonshire £536.69 £557.18 £582.31 £695.89 
Northumberland*+ £419.30 £523.85 £466.12 £463.80 
Nottingham* £449.57 £406.65 £503.76 £481.92 
Nottinghamshire £453.12 £562.85 £548.46 £537.82 
Oldham*+ £4,311.29 -£794.43 £458.43 £436.08 
Oxfordshire+ £816.67 £898.96 £803.59 £936.06 
Peterborough+ £947.53 £351.90 £723.07 £493.28 
Plymouth* £403.08 £426.51 £589.59 £565.26 
Poole*+ £682.63 £650.86 £713.96 £784.49 
Portsmouth* £1,639.15 £710.61 £740.41 £654.27 
Reading* £733.13 £573.78 £953.28 £718.44 
Redbridge* £635.36 £577.22 £825.59 £818.71 
Redcar and Cleveland* £689.22 £396.52 £538.70 £562.53 
Richmond upon Thames+ £805.11 £916.87 £888.30 £1,063.58 
Rochdale*+ £393.88 £431.34 £480.92 £441.72 
Rotherham*+ £320.77 £473.87 £429.30 £404.27 
Rutland*+ £751.09 £626.76 £678.76 £692.23 
Salford*+ £428.55 £420.37 £385.52 £413.27 
Sandwell* £387.06 £341.36 £639.28 £659.18 
Sefton £477.42 £527.09 £504.38 £584.46 
Sheffield £597.03 £416.46 £517.71 £524.71 
Shropshire £533.90 £648.60 £581.60 £572.30 
Slough* £1,710.92 £912.87 £1,039.61 £1,018.63 
Solihull*+ £465.60 £662.90 £645.98 £600.35 
Somerset* £574.85 £623.91 £649.94 £648.85 
South Gloucestershire* £486.82 £596.33 £577.46 £688.56 
South Tyneside*+ £472.46 £417.25 £460.10 £436.83 
Southampton* £588.82 £473.40 £715.47 £595.32 
Southend-on-Sea* £500.63 £539.33 £653.66 £604.16 
Southwark+ N/A N/A -£1,766.99 £1,182.96 
St. Helens* £388.52 £463.78 £568.22 £563.85 
Staffordshire* £564.00 £483.50 £481.01 £625.36 
Stockport £543.62 £596.07 £547.74 £541.27 
Stockton-on-Tees*+ £407.44 £446.85 £508.72 £438.22 
Stoke-on-Trent*+ £533.92 £318.96 £631.52 £393.22 
Suffolk £537.15 £610.15 £792.09 £760.27 
Sunderland*+ £383.55 £349.79 £413.24 £422.99 
Surrey*+ £790.95 £1,074.68 £872.78 £914.56 
Sutton* £700.80 £568.70 £699.88 £774.11 
Swindon* £627.64 £497.44 £806.75 £815.68 
Tameside*+ £131.25 £261.88 £392.56 £413.81 
Telford and Wrekin £497.77 £527.94 £594.46 £581.82 
Thurrock* £320.32 £514.77 N/A N/A 
Torbay*+ £505.69 £527.65 £511.12 £474.83 
Tower Hamlets*+ £2,020.41 £1,271.14 £1,035.00 £962.47 
Trafford* £618.82 £685.37 £683.56 £673.49 
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Wakefield £449.29 £483.50 £514.08 £498.29 
Walsall*+ £443.28 £438.79 £327.82 £413.39 
Waltham Forest* £871.52 £519.04 £861.96 £608.82 
Wandsworth £994.78 £895.01 £1,216.65 £1,302.95 
Warrington* £595.37 £561.65 £580.51 £690.63 
Warwickshire+ £651.09 £648.48 £697.32 £689.41 
West Berkshire* £747.91 £672.41 £1,018.51 £960.84 
West Sussex*+ £599.18 £939.46 £714.76 £729.91 
Westminster N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Wigan* £378.56 £404.51 £526.48 £538.54 
Wiltshire* £702.35 £686.70 £837.71 £926.21 
Windsor and 
Maidenhead*+ 
£926.26 £948.64 £998.52 £887.66 
Wirral* £459.60 £526.95 £582.99 £642.05 
Wokingham*+ £850.98 £684.72 £900.87 £831.81 
Wolverhampton*+ £398.23 £405.98 £482.41 £547.21 
Worcestershire £601.89 £641.05 £658.01 £601.56 
York £632.51 £636.64 £773.59 £787.29 
N/A indicates that the proportion of LA-funded residents in the LA was estimated to be over 1, and 
therefore no self-funded price was estimated as there is unlikely to be a self-funded market in these 
LAs. 
* indicates that the adjusted average fees gap was estimated using multiple imputation for 2008 and 
therefore less confidence can be attached to the estimated average self-funded price shown. 
+ indicates that the adjusted average fees gap was estimated using multiple imputation for 2010 and 
















Table A3: Overall means of estimated average self-funder price 
Estimation Mean price S.D. 
Basic £663.13NS £392.35 
Adjusted £629.53 £242.17 
Adjusted (85% Occ.) £638.95** £234.05 
Adjusted (95% Occ.) £623.03* £208.57 
Adjusted (min/max) £609.22** £252.13 
NS, *, **, and *** indicate no significance or significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, 
in a test of the equality of means between the relevant estimated self-funder price and the 
estimated adjusted self-funder price. 
 
